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CREDIT CONSTRAINTS, JOB MOBILITY, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP:
EVIDENCE FROM A PROPERTY REFORM IN CHINA
Shing-Yi Wang*
Abstract—This paper provides new evidence on the impact of private property rights and employer-provided housing on entrepreneurship. I find an
increase in self-employment following a reform in urban China that allowed
state employees who were renting state-owned housing the opportunity to
buy their homes at subsidized prices. I develop a model of job choice to test
two mechanisms that might explain how the reform increased entrepreneurship. I find evidence that the reform reduced labor mobility costs and
alleviated credit constraints by allowing households to capitalize on the
value of the real estate.

I.

Introduction

S

TATE-OWNED housing represents a large share of housing stock in low-income countries. Data from the United
Nations Human Settlements Indicators (United Nations,
2001) suggest that residents in state-owned housing represent
18% of households in Africa, 16% in Asia, and 8% in Latin
America. Unlike public housing in high-income countries,
which is provided as a welfare benefit to low-income households, the bulk of state-owned housing in Africa and Asia is
provided as an in-kind benefit to employees in the government
and in state-owned enterprises. While the potential problems
of undersupply, corruption, and poor maintenance have been
widely recognized (Fishback, 1992; Wang & Murie, 1999),
there is a remarkable lack of evidence that measures the
labor market consequences of such housing programs or that
explores the mechanisms through which the effects work.
This paper uses a reform of employer-provided housing
in China as a natural experiment to analyze how the state
provision of housing affects labor market decisions. Beginning in 1994, the reform offered state employees who were
provided rental housing by their employers the opportunity
to purchase their homes at subsidized prices. It was a largescale program that affected over 40% of urban households
in China. In this paper, I focus on the impact of the property
reform on the decision to enter into entrepreneurship because
entrepreneurs are regarded as key agents in fostering the innovation and investment necessary for economic development
(Banerjee & Newman 1993). In addition to showing that
the reform increased self-employment, I explore two mechanisms through which state ownership of property might affect
entrepreneurship. First, in a credit-constrained environment,
the privatization of state assets could allow individuals to
capitalize on the value associated with the real estate in
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ways that they cannot as renters.1 Second, the unbundling
of housing from the employment decisions of individuals
could increase aggregate job mobility, including transitions
into entrepreneurship.
The first mechanism focuses on the institutions that allow
the capital embedded in property to be used in a productive
manner. Economic research supports the importance of private property rights for economic development (Acemoglu,
Johnson, & Robinson, 2001), as well as for householdlevel decisions regarding labor (Field, 2007) and investment
(Besley, 1995; Field, 2005; Galiani & Schargrodsky, 2010).
This paper contributes to the existing property rights literature by offering an empirical test of the idea that private
property rights allow individuals to fully capitalize on the
value of their property. De Soto (2000) popularized the idea
that the real estate occupied by urban squatters contains vast
amounts of potential wealth that could be transformed into
capital for entrepreneurial ventures through the formalization
of property rights. The focus of this paper is on the creation
of private property rights over the stock of state-owned housing rather than the formalization of property rights for urban
squatters.
The ability to access the value associated with property
is relevant for entrepreneurial ventures in the presence of
credit market imperfections. Evidence for severe credit constraints has been found for firms (Banerjee & Duflo, 2004, in
India; De Mel, McKenzie, & Woodruff, 2008, in Sri Lanka;
McKenzie & Woodruff, 2006, in Mexico), as well as for
agriculture (Udry & Anagol, 2006, in Ghana). This paper
is more closely aligned with the credit constraints literature that examines the individual-level decision to enter into
entrepreneurship. Research by Evans and Jovanovic (1989)
in the United States, Paulson and Townsend (2004) in Thailand, and Djankov, Qian, Roland, and Zhuravskaya (2006)
in China find a positive relationship between preexisting
wealth and the probability of entry into entrepreneurship.
The notion that wealth predicts entrepreneurship is seen as
evidence that wealthy individuals are able to finance their
business ideas, while less wealthy individuals are unable
to raise the capital necessary to start up or maintain their
business ventures. However, if wealth is correlated with unobserved ability, then there can be a positive correlation between
wealth and entrepreneurship in the absence of credit market imperfections. Research that attempts to instrument for
wealth with inheritances and housing prices provides mixed
results (Hurst & Lusardi, 2004; Fairlie & Krashinsky, 2006).
However, inheritances are arguably not exogenous, and the
1 The model by Banerjee and Newman (1993) demonstrates how
credit market imperfections can lead to barriers to entry for potential
entrepreneurs, and have negative effects on aggregate economic growth
and the income distribution.
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changes in housing prices used in these papers may be too
small to produce a salient wealth effect. I use an exogenous change in access to housing wealth to separate the
effect of credit constraints from omitted variables that affect
an individual’s decision to start a small business. Unlike
the small-scale changes in wealth used in other papers, the
value associated with the property occupied by state housing
tenants was quite large.
In addition to credit constraints, this paper considers
job mobility as a second factor that affects entry into
entrepreneurship. The special features of the housing system
in China make it both interesting and necessary to consider
job mobility when analyzing the labor market choices of individuals in China. The bundling of housing benefits with a
specific employer in the state sector could have reduced labor
mobility because individuals were unable to stay in their current homes if they switched jobs. To my knowledge, this
paper is one of the first analyses of the economic effects of
employer-provided housing benefits.2 A related literature on
in-kind benefits and job mobility focuses on the provision of
health insurance in the United States (Madrian, 1994; Kapur,
1998; Buchmueller & Valleta, 1996; Gruber & Madrian,
2002). For both health insurance in the United States and
housing provision in China, the level of employer-provided
benefits does not directly reflect worker productivity. For
example, American employees with large families receive
greater compensation in the form of health insurance coverage than equally productive single workers. The methods
of the health insurance literature do not apply to employerprovided housing because the outside cost of health insurance
varies based on individual characteristics such as preexisting conditions, whereas market housing prices do not vary
across individuals. My research is also related to work on
the labor market effects of different systems of housing,
such as welfare housing (Hughes & McCormick, 1987) and
rent control (Svarer, Rosholm, & Munch 2004). My analysis
focuses on housing that is tied to employment rather than to
a neighborhood or a specific apartment.
My baseline identification strategy uses a differences-indifferences approach in comparing the outcomes of the same
individuals before and after the reform, as well as relative
to a control group of similar individuals. I use both a state
sector and a private sector comparison group and find substantial treatment effects relative to both groups. While the
treatment group is not exogenously determined, the panel
structure of the data set allows me to provide empirical support for the identification assumption of parallel trends in
self-employment between the two groups before the reform.
To understand the mechanisms that underlie the program’s
effect on entrepreneurship and the identification issues in my
empirical work, I develop a theoretical model of job choice
that incorporates features of the Chinese labor market. The

model allows heterogeneity in unobserved individual characteristics such as entrepreneurial ability and connections in the
state sector. The framework provides insight into how individuals sort into different types of housing and employment
sectors. It also yields predictions that allow me to examine the
two mechanisms through which the sale of state-owned housing during the housing reform could have led to an increase
in entrepreneurship.
Using data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey,
my estimates suggest that the vast majority of residents in
state-owned housing chose to purchase their homes at the
subsidized price. Furthermore, the reform increased the log
odds that former state housing residents entered into selfemployment by two times. The data also provide strong
evidence of labor mobility among former residents of stateowned housing, as well as some evidence of growth in the
amount of business capital that they owned. An extrapolation of the estimates suggests that the property reform freed
around 10 billion RMB from former state-owned housing for
productive enterprises. This represents an increase of 14% on
an estimated 67 billion RMB of capital investment in urban
household enterprises in 1993.
The results on general labor mobility presented in this
paper are consistent with Iyer, Meng, and Qian’s (2009) subsequent examination of various types of housing reforms in
China.3 However, their paper differs in its conclusion that
there was no effect on entrepreneurship or credit constraints.
Their identification strategy assumes that city-level reforms
in the majority of urban areas occurred prior to 1994 and
gave households in state-owned housing the opportunity to
purchase their units as early as 1988.4 However, the summary statistics for home ownership rates in their data and in
the CHNS are not consistent with this assumption; both sets
of data indicate that the rise in home ownership was completely flat until 1993. Furthermore, their lack of results may
be explained by an identification strategy that compares very
different types of reforms across cities. The literature (discussed in the next section) indicates that some small-scale
experiments occurred prior to 1994 but they varied in their
focus on rent reform or privatization and differed widely in
their pricing and property rights. Given the large size of their
standard errors, it is not possible to reject that the results are
consistent with the findings in this paper.
The following section presents an overview of the institutional background. Section III offers the theoretical framework. Section IV discusses the data and the empirical
methodology. After I establish that the reform increased
entrepreneurship in section V, the next two sections use the
predictions of the model to examine whether the increase can
be explained by the unbundling of housing from employment
(section VI) or the alleviation of credit constraints (section
VII). Section VIII concludes.
3 Their

2 Wang

(2011) measures the degree of misallocation associated with the
Chinese system of employer-provided housing and the equilibrium housing
price effects of the removal of this type of housing misallocation.
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work follows a previous version of this paper (Wang, 2008).
identification strategy also relies on differences in the timing of
implementation across cities, but the endogeneity of the decision of when
to privatize between 1988 or 1997 is not addressed.
4 The
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II.

Institutional Background

A. Socialism and Early Reforms

Upon taking control in 1949, the Communist Party nationalized land in urban areas and established a system that
guaranteed jobs for all workers. Households with private
ownership of homes retained full property rights to their residences, but the government established public ownership of
all new housing stock. Public housing stock was allocated to
urban residents through state work units, and nominal rents
were charged.
Following the death of Chairman Mao in 1976, the new
leadership initiated a gradual reform of the socialist system
toward a mixed economy. A reform of the housing system was
considered because the government recognized serious problems in the state provision of housing, including shortages,
poor management, and corruption in the distribution (Wang &
Murie, 1999). Private construction of housing was allowed,
and the supply of private housing expanded. The first experiments on the public housing system entailed the sale of newly
built apartments at construction cost in Xian and and Nanning
in 1979. During the 1980s, several other small-scale housing
experiments were piloted in different cities. These included
a program that split the cost of housing between workers
and state work units and a voucher system in which employees paid additional rent if their housing allotment exceeded
the value of the voucher. One of the most serious proposals
outlined by the federal government included simultaneously
increasing rents and wages and encouraging state tenants to
buy their homes at full cost (Pudney & Wang, 1995). The
small-scale attempts at privatizing housing failed because
people found the prices too high.
After the political protests and subsequent military crackdown in Tiananmen Square in 1989, the central government
shifted the discussion about housing reform toward rent
increases rather than privatization. The government realized
its past ideas for privatization were financially infeasible
as well as politically destabilizing (Davis, 1993). Davis’s
interviews with urban residents confirm that the central and
municipal governments hid their plans for full commodification of urban housing assets from most of the population
through the early 1990s. While the experimentation in the
1980s clearly demonstrated the government’s interest in
housing reform, qualitative research suggests that the urban
population did not foresee the timing and specific nature of
the reform. In section VA, my empirical analysis confirms
that anticipation of the reform did not affect prereform labor
market choices.
B. Privatization of Public Housing Units

In July 1994, the State Council outlined the procedures
for state employers to sell public housing units to sitting tenants in urban areas throughout the country. Individuals in
state-owned housing were given the opportunity to buy full or
partial property rights to their current homes. Partial property

rights included use rights for perpetuity, the right to bequeath,
and the right to use the home as collateral for loans. After five
years of ownership, individuals with partial property rights
gained the right to sell the home but shared the profits from
the sale with their work units.5 In contrast, those purchasing
full property rights faced no restrictions in the use or sale of
their homes and retained all profits.
Learning from the public response to housing experiments
in the 1980s, the government allowed work units to set prices
for their housing stock below market value with additional
discounts based on seniority. According to the China News
Analysis (“Guangxi’s Housing Reform Success,” 1998), most
buyers paid less than 15% of the market value for their homes.
While the option to buy the home had no specified time limit,
the government encouraged immediate purchase by specifying a schedule of price increases over time. As added
incentive to purchase homes, the reform included proposals to increase rents in state-owned housing units by up to
fifteen times to bring them closer in line with market rates.
The generous price subsidies allowed most households to buy
the homes outright. Households without the cash to purchase
their homes had the incentive to take mortgage loans because
they would gain the difference between the market value and
the government sale price. Households in state-owned housing were not so constrained that they were unable to raise the
amounts necessary to purchase their homes. Thus, the credit
constraints hypothesis examined in this context is whether
some households required an amount of capital to start a
business that was larger than the subsidized cost of the home
and whether the substantial gap between the market value of
the housing units and the price charged during the property
reform allowed them to make business investments that they
would have been otherwise unable to make.
The housing reform that began in 1994 transformed China
into a country with one of the highest rates of home ownership in the world. The success of the reform in increasing the
rates of home ownership among state employees is demonstrated in figure 1, which displays the rates of home ownership
by the employment status of the household head. The trend
for households headed by state employees demonstrates a
dramatic increase in home ownership following 1993, while
the trend for households headed by private employees is
relatively flat.
Data from the Chinese Household Income Project covering
urban areas in eleven provinces in 1995 indicate that the average difference between the market value and the price charged
by the government was 24,462 RMB, which is more than two
times the average annual wages of a household.6 While the
5 In some cases, the subsequent sale of former public units had additional
limitations. For example, apartments sold to public university employees who were located on campus could not be sold on the open market.
On-campus property had to be sold back to the university or to other university employees. Such strict limitations on sale were not common outside
university housing systems.
6 The calculation is based on the sample of 6,931 households in the Chinese
Household Income Project of 1995, which was selected from a sample of
35,000 urban households from the State Statistical Bureau.
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Figure 1.—Aggregate Trends in Home Ownership in Urban Areas
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Figure 2.—Urban Aggregate Trends in State Employment and
Self-Employment

Source: China Health Nutrition Survey (CHNS).
Source: CHNS.

terms of the sale of state housing assets were highly subsidized, the prereform rents charged by the government were
also extremely subsidized. The average present discounted
value of future rent subsidies under the prereform system is
calculated to equal 20,500 RMB.7 This is roughly equivalent to the 24,462 RMB subsidy in the sale price during the
reform.8 Thus, while the terms of the sale were subsidized,
they did not imply a large wealth transfer; rather the reform
allowed individuals to access and capitalize on the value associated with their homes that they had previously only been
able to occupy. The effect of the housing reform operated
through the transformation of use rights into private property
rights rather than through a wealth effect associated with the
terms of the sale.
While the value associated with each home was substantial, its relevance for entrepreneurship depends on whether the
home equity could be accessed. There are at least three ways
that individuals could access the value of their homes after the
reform. First, after acquiring full property rights, individuals
could sell their homes. Appendix table A3 shows the households that were given the opportunity to buy their state-owned
rentals were more likely than other groups to change residences within the sample area following the reform. Although
there were restrictions on outright sale among individuals
who purchased partial property rights, they could still access
the wealth by renting out rooms or using the home as collateral in loans from both formal and informal sources.9 An
7 This calculation is based on the assumption that individuals believed
the current system would persist and on an expected life expectancy of 75
years for urban residents and a real interest rate of 2% in China in 1994.
The average age and prereform rent subsidy of state housing tenants used
in the calculation are based on data shown in table 1.
8 In other words, state-owned housing tenants expected to receive a wealth
transfer from the state in the form of subsidized rent every month. The
reform converted the flow of those subsidies into an equivalent transfer of
value that they could access immediately.
9 Formal sector lending by banking institutions is less common in China
than in developed countries such as the United States. However, evidence
suggests that informal sector lending is common in China (Feder et al.,

article in the Financial Times (Kynge, 2002) emphasized
the importance of loans collateralized by housing: “Having recently bought an apartment from his state employer
at a steep discount, he felt galvanized to put his asset to
work. . . . Mr. Yao is one of millions of Chinese discovering the delights of collateral. A boom in home ownership
in most large cities over the past five years has furnished
many people with their first genuinely valuable asset and
the Chinese are proving enthusiastic borrowers.” A Gallup
poll on borrowing behavior in China in 2005 (Arora, 2005)
found that personal borrowing to start or operate a business
was the top reason that individuals go into debt (42% of
respondents).
Figure 2 shows rates of state employment and selfemployment in urban areas from 1989 to 2004. The timeseries patterns provide visual evidence of a break in employment trends following the start of the reform in 1994 and
are consistent with movement from the state sector into selfemployment. Aggregate employment in the state sector was
8% lower in the three periods after the reform than before,
and self-employment rose by 12%.
III.

Theoretical Framework

A. A Model of Employment and Housing Choices

I develop a static model of employment and housing decisions that incorporates elements of Evans and Jovanovic’s
(1989) model of entrepreneurial choice with liquidity constraints. Suppose the utility of individual i employed in sector

1992). A 2004 survey by the Beijing Central University of Finance and Economics of twenty provinces estimated the amount of underground lending
in China at $101 billion, equivalent to 28% of the funds lent through formal sources (Li, 2005). Further evidence indicates that loans from nonbank
sources are often collateralized by assets including housing (Watts, 2005;
Guo & Mu, 1998).
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l is a function of housing, hil , and nonhousing consumption,
Cil , is
max U(Cil , hil ),
hil ,kil

Figure 3.—Case of Yp > Ys

(1)

where l ∈ {s, p, e} and s indicates the state sector, p the private wage sector, and e entrepreneurship. The constraints
differ by sector because the model allows borrowing only
to finance capital, and capital investment is relevant only in
the entrepreneurial sector. The budget constraint for a wage
employee in the private or state sector is
Cil + ql hil = Yil + rWi ,

(2)

and for an entrepreneur, it is
rbil + Cil + ql hil = Yil (kil )
kil = Wi + bil
−Wi ≤ bil ≤ λ(ql hil + Wi ),

(3)
(4)
(5)

where kil is capital, r equals the cost of borrowing plus 1, ql
is the price of a unit of housing, and the price of consumption
is normalized to equal 1. Individuals are credit constrained in
their investment in capital and the net amount that they can
borrow, given by bil . The net amount borrowed cannot exceed
a proportion of their total wealth, which includes the value of
their homes, ql hil , and their liquid assets, Wi . The proportion
is denoted by λ, where 0 < λ < 1. If she chooses not to
own capital (kil = 0 and bil = −Wil ), she can lend out her
wealth. The amount the individual earns in sector l is Yil . The
utility function is assumed to be increasing and concave in
both consumption and housing. Sorting into the three sectors
is driven by differences in their housing compensation and
earnings in the various sectors.
Wages in the private and state sectors are functions of
individual i’s set of observable characteristics, xi , given by
Yip = yp (xi , ζi ) and Yis = ys (xi , ψi ), respectively, where ζi
is an unobserved component of wages in the private sector
and ψi the unobserved component of state wages. The market price for a unit of housing for entrepreneurs and private
wage employees is q (qp = qe = q). Workers in the state sector receive an amount of housing allocation, 
hi = 
h(xi , μi ),
to rent for free (qs = 0). The person’s observable characteristics, xi , and some unobservable characteristics, μi ,
determine the amount of public housing that the individual receives. This reflects the evidence that the allocation of
public housing units depended on observable worker characteristics such as job tenure and rank, as well as unobservable
traits such as social connections (Logan & Zhou, 1996). I
assume that μi and ψi are not perfectly correlated, and Appendix A provides empirical support for this assumption. Net
entrepreneurial earnings are given by Yie = θi f (ki ), where
θi reflects entrepreneurial ability and f (. ) is the production
function that is concave in the amount of capital invested in
the business, ki .

The total utility an individual derives from working in the
state sector is given by Vis = U(Yis + rWi , 
hi ).10 The total
utility of a worker in the private sector is Vip = U(Yip +rWi −
qhi∗ , hi∗ ), and hi∗ solves the relevant first-order condition. The
total utility of an entrepreneur is Vie = U(θi f (k̄i ) − r k̄i +
rWi − qh̄i , h̄i ), where the amount of housing chosen is such
that

if bi∗ < λ(qh̄i + Wi )
−qUc + Uh = 0
h̄i solves
−q(1 + rλ)Uc + Uh = 0 if bi∗ = λ(qh̄i + Wi ).
(6)
The entrepreneur also selects the amount of capital to invest in
her business. At an interior solution, the first-order condition
with respect to k yields ki∗ , which solves θi f  (ki ) = r. However, the maximum capital accessible for the entrepreneur
is constrained such that ki ≤ (1 + λ)Wi + λqh̄i . Thus,
k̄i = min{ki∗ , kicc } where kicc = (1+λ)Wi +λqh̄i . For kicc < ki∗ ,
we have that θi f (kicc ) < θi f (ki∗ ), and the total value of being
an entrepreneur, Vie , is lower for individuals with binding
credit constraints. Thus, it is possible that a constrained individual chooses not to be an entrepreneur even though she
would have if she were able to achieve the optimal level of
capital investment, ki∗ . Credit constraints will produce a correlation between individuals’ total wealth and their probability
of entering entrepreneurship.
For a worker with given values of Wi , xi , ζi , and ψi such that
yp (xi , ζi ) > ys (xi , ψi ), her optimal choice across job sectors
can be represented by the solid lines in figure 3.11 The values θ+ and 
h+ are the reservation values that delineate the
choices of workers based on their unobserved heterogeneity
in μi and θi . More specifically, θ+ is the value of θi at which
10 This assumes that all state employees receive and accept the housing
offered in the state sector. This simplification allows me to focus on the
implications of employer-provided housing in the state sector and does not
change the fundamental results of the model. In reality, many state employees live in private housing because they are waiting for a state housing
assignment or because their preferences and budget constraints bring them
to consume a level of housing that is different from their state assignment.
11 For an individual for whom y (x , ζ ) < y (x , ψ ), the choice simplifies
p i i
s i
i
to a binary choice between entrepreneurship and the state job. The individual
will not choose the private sector because she will receive higher wages and
a nonnegative housing benefit in the state sector.

CREDIT CONSTRAINTS, JOB MOBILITY, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP

an individual is indifferent between private wage employment and self-employment. Similarly, 
h+ is the reservation
value of housing benefits needed to make the individual indifferent between working for the state or a private firm. Finally,
for individuals with high draws of both θ and μ, there are
values of θi and 
hi such that the individual is indifferent
between entrepreneurship and state employment, Vie = Vis .
This locus of points in (θ, 
h) space is determined by
U(Yis + rWi , 
hi ) = U(θi f (k̄i ) − r k̄i + rWi − qh̄i , h̄i ). (7)
This is represented by the solid curve in figure 3 and defines
the employment decision for workers with high levels of
both θi and 
h(μi ).12
As a result of the sorting process, individuals with higher
levels of 
h(μ) also have higher average levels of θ. Holding
constant other characteristics, individuals with high levels of
θ and low levels of 
h(μ) will work as entrepreneurs. Thus,
high θ types will locate in the state sector only if their housing allocation 
h(μ) exceeds the threshold level. A similar
explanation applies to the relationship between 
h(μ) and the
unobservable factor, ζi , that influences wages in the private
sector.13 High levels of 
h(μ) observed in the state sector will
also correspond to higher average amounts of ζi .
B. Theoretical Implications of the Housing Reform

Loosening credit constraints increases the likelihood of
self-employment by allowing individuals to move closer to
k ∗ from k cc . In figure 3, this would cause the curved line
defined by equation (7) to shift down from the solid line
to the dotted line.14 However, the housing reform loosens
credit constraints only for state employees in public housing.
Thus, only individuals in the shaded area in figure 3 (between
the solid and dotted curved lines) shift from state employees to entrepreneurs. The credit constraints of private wage
employees are not changed by the housing program, so none
of the boundaries that determine their optimal employment
decisions adjust.
By allowing workers to purchase their homes, the program
removed the flow benefit of housing provision in the state
sector. Because ∂Vis /∂
h > 0, the housing program reduced
an individual’s value of Vis and increased the likelihood of
moving out of the state job. By decreasing the flow of housing benefits tied to state employment, 
h(μi ), to 0 for state
employees who purchase the home, the reform shifts individuals left to their corresponding points on the y-axis and
causes individuals to shift left in figure 3. In this case, all state
workers for whom Yp > Ys will enter the private sector or
entrepreneurship.
12 The concave shape of the boundary is quite intuitive. The formal
derivation of this result is available from the author.
13 Figure 3 delineates the optimal employment decisions of individuals
h+ will also
holding ζi constant. As ζi increases, the threshold levels θ+ and 
increase and expand the area over which private wage employment is the
optimal decision. It is possible to imagine a three-dimensional space that
shows how ζ, θ, and 
h define the optimal employment choices.
14 The corresponding calculations are available from the author.
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As the theoretical framework demonstrates, there are
two ways that the housing reform could increase transitions from employment in a state-owned enterprise into
entrepreneurship. The creation of private property rights during the housing reform allowed individuals to invest more
capital into a small business and increased the returns to
entrepreneurship in the presence of credit constraints. On
top of that, the unbundling of employment and housing
provision reduced the nonwage benefits of state employment and increased the relative attractiveness of nonstate
jobs.
I look for evidence for credit constraints in two empirical tests. The model predicts that the wealth that people
hold and the value of their homes should predict selfemployment (∂Vie /∂(Wi + qhi ) > 0) only if there are
credit constraints. I examine variation in the postreform
appreciation of housing prices to avoid the potential identification that arises if total wealth is positively correlated
with unobservable entrepreneurial ability. More specifically,
I use regional heterogeneity in the appreciation of housing prices to test whether housing wealth influenced entry
into entrepreneurship. The second implication of the credit
constraints hypothesis is that the property reform should
have increased the levels of capital investment for prereform
residents of public housing.
The model also generates two predictions to test whether
the provision of housing benefits in the state sector was
internalized by individuals in their labor market decisions.
A reduction in the value of housing subsidies, 
h, induces
individuals to shift out of the state sector and into both selfemployment and private wage employment. In contrast, a
reduction in credit constraints predicts transitions only into
self-employment and not into private wage jobs. Thus, the
movement of state sector workers with housing benefits into
private wage employment supports the unbundling hypothesis. A second prediction is generated from a simple extension
of the model into a dynamic context. If the prereform system
of providing state-owned housing with state jobs reduced
labor mobility, we should see that the average wage gains
accompanying job changes out of the state sector in the prereform period should be larger than the average gains in the
postreform period. In other words, wp,t − ws,t−1 should be
larger before the reform because individuals leaving the state
sector would need additional compensation for the loss of
subsidized housing.
Furthermore, the amount of rent subsidy that individuals
received before the reform provides heterogeneity in the
effects of bundling housing with state employment. The
model demonstrated that individuals with more 
h should
have higher levels of abilities in private wage employment,
ζ, and in entrepreneurship, θ. Not only does the bundling
hypothesis imply an increase in mobility that is not limited
to transitions into entrepreneurship, but it also suggests that
the effect on mobility should increase with prereform levels
of 
h. Similarly, not only should the wage gains be larger
for individuals leaving the state sector before the reform,
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but the prereform wage gains of job changers should be
positively correlated with 
h.
IV.

Data and Methodology

A. China Health and Nutrition Survey

The panel data used in this analysis come from the China
Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). The CHNS covers
nine provinces (Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan,
Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, and Shandong), which
vary considerably in their geography and levels of economic
development. The survey was sampled with a multistage,
random cluster design. Counties were stratified into three levels of income, and a weighted sampling technique randomly
selected four counties in each province. In addition, the data
include the provincial capital and one low-income city. The
data cover approximately 4,400 households and 16,000 individuals in the years 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2004.
Thus, the data include three waves before and three waves
after the beginning of the housing reform in 1994. While the
survey contains both urban and rural households, the sample
used in this analysis is limited to the urban sample because
the housing reform was implemented only in urban areas.15
This paper focuses on labor market choices, so I limit the
sample to working-age adults between 18 and 60 years old.
Households with more than one generation of adults are not
uncommon in urban China, but I restrict the individual-level
analysis to household heads and spouses of heads. Furthermore, I exclude individuals who were enrolled in school or
retired.
Entrepreneurs are defined as individuals who report their
primary occupation as self-employed. This categorization
excludes individuals who engage in entrepreneurial activities in addition to a full-time wage job. While less than
4% of adults in the CHNS report a secondary job, threequarters of this subsample engage in self-employment as
their secondary labor market activity. Although not shown,
the results in this paper are robust to the inclusion of people
whose secondary job is self-employed. I also examine a definition of entrepreneurship as households that own a small
business. This measure is highly correlated with individual
self-employment. The results are similar, with slightly larger
standard errors. Household business ownership is subject to
more measurement error because the survey question changes
between 1993 and 1997.
The theoretical model simplifies the employment structure
of the Chinese economy by splitting the world into three sectors of employment: state, private, and self-employed. The
survey allows individuals to categorize themselves into five
sectors of employment: state, private, small collective, large
collective, and other. In China, employment in collective
enterprises is less relevant in urban areas than in rural areas.
It is rare for collective work units to provide employees with
15 I define urban areas as neighborhoods where the majority of households
have urban registrations.

subsidized housing, so for the purposes of my analysis, it is
not important to distinguish them from private wage employees. The empirical results presented in the paper are largely
robust to the exclusion of collective employees from the sample and to the categorization of collective employees as state
employees.
One of the main limitations of the data set is that there
is no information on households, borrowing behavior. Thus,
it is not possible to separate whether credit constraints are
alleviated through borrowing against the value of the home
or through other methods such as selling the former state
housing unit for a smaller or rented home.
B. Econometric Methodology

To evaluate the causal impact of the policy change on individual outcomes, I use a differences-in-differences framework. The idea underlying the identification strategy is to
compare the outcome not only before and after the reform
but also between a treatment group and a control group. After
the central announcement of the policy change occurred in
July 1994, the start of the implementation of the housing
reform varied at the regional level. I am unable to exploit this
variation because the data set used in this analysis was not
collected between 1993 and 1997, and all areas in the data
set had implemented the reform by 1997.
The CHNS does not explicitly ask whether tenants of stateowned housing received the opportunity to buy their home
during the reform, so I am unable to separate households
that declined the opportunity to purchase a home from those
that were not offered the opportunity.16 I identify the treatment group (State_Resident89 = 1) as all household heads
and spouses of heads in state-owned housing with at least one
member of the couple in state employment in 1989 or the next
prereform wave in which data are available.17 Classification
of individuals into the treatment and control groups occurs
at the couple level. In other words, public housing tenants
who are not employed in the state sector but married to state
employees are categorized in the treatment category. A substantial fraction of state employees are married to other state
employees, and it would not be possible to identify housing
rights at the individual level for these couples.
One comparison group includes all household heads and
spouses living in privately owned homes and not employed
in a state-owned enterprise in 1989 (or the next prereform
wave in which data are available). These individuals should
not experience a direct effect from the reform of state-owned
housing. I also define a second comparison group that encompasses household heads and spouses not living in state-owned
housing but with at least one member in state employment in
16 Over 80% of households living in state-owned housing in 1993 transitioned into private housing by 1997, so any bias in the estimates would not
be large.
17 In other words, in cases where the data are missing for 1989, treatment
status is defined with the next earliest prereform wave (1991 or 1993) for
which data are available.
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Table 1.—Summary Statistics in 1993
Treatment: State_Resident89 = 1

Control 1: Other State Employees

Control 2: Non-State Home Owners

A: Individual Characteristics
Male
Age
Married
Years of education
Real hourly wage
Service occupation
Private wage employed
Self-employed
Observations

0.53
(0.50)
41.02
(8.98)
0.98
(0.14)
10.26
(3.43)
0.62
(0.49)
0.17
(0.38)
0.10
(0.30)
0.02
(0.12)
579

0.56
(0.50)
42.25
(8.72)
0.99
(0.11)
8.15∗
(3.62)
0.72
(0.56)
0.28∗
(0.45)
0.30∗
(0.46)
0.08∗
(0.29)
233

0.53
(0.50)
40.07
(5.54)
0.98
(0.14)
7.25∗
(3.37)
0.90∗
(0.70)
0.21∗
(0.40)
0.57∗
(0.50)
0.40∗
(0.49)
290

4.28∗
(1.56)
0.50
(5.27)
3,693
(8,129)
0.28∗
(0.55)
0.17∗
(0.38)
78.73∗
(8,129)
0.46∗
(0.50)
0.21∗
(0.41)
0.41∗
(0.49)
0.05
(0.21)
217

4.38∗
(1.44)
1.06∗
(11.52)
4,364
(9,237)
0.18∗
(0.28)
0.24∗
(0.43)
260.9∗
(1,199)
0.57∗
(0.50)
0.01∗
(0.11)
0.03∗
(0.36)
0.01∗
(0.09)
239

B: Household Characteristics
Household size
Rent subsidy per month
Durable nonhousing assets
Cadre in household
Positive capital holdings
Capital
Head and spouse working
Head and spouse state employed
Male state employed only
Female state employed only
Observations

3.31
(0.86)
66.31
(64.68)
3,522
(2,339)
0.49
(0.72)
0.03
(0.17)
21.06
(307)
0.68
(0.47)
0.67
(0.47)
0.16
(0.36)
0.06
(0.23)
395

Standard deviations in parentheses. ∗ Denotes that the control group is significantly different from the treatment group at the 5% level. Wage, assets, capital, and rent subsidy are in real 1990 RMB.

1989 (or the next prereform wave in which data are available). There are a few anecdotal accounts of state-owned
enterprises offering monetary compensation to employees
not living in public housing at the time of the reform to offset
the associated loss for workers on the waiting list for public housing allocations. However, the evidence suggests that
this compensation was not universal and the value did not
approach the large transfer associated with the subsidized
home sale. Furthermore, any wealth transfer to individuals
in the state-employed control group would bias the estimates toward accepting the null hypothesis of equality in the
outcome between the treatment and the control group. The
state-employed control group also offers the advantage of
absorbing other changes occurring in the state sector around
the time of the housing reform. Thus, this control group
removes the effect of changes in the wage structure, increases
in layoffs in the public sector, or decreases in the provision
of other in-kind benefits.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the groups in the
year immediately before the implementation of the reform.
The treatment group is statistically similar to the control

groups along several dimensions, including gender, age, marital status, and durable nonhousing assets (which equals the
sum of a household’s self-reported market value of durable
goods but does not include housing or financial assets).18
As expected, the treatment group is different from the control groups along a number of labor market characteristics.
Households living in state-owned housing in 1993 have more
members who hold positions as cadres.19 The real hourly
wage of individuals in the treatment group is significantly
lower than the privately employed control, but not significantly different from the control group of individuals in state
employment.20 The rent subsidy is calculated as the difference between the self-reported market rental value and the
rent paid per month. It is 66 RMB per month for the treatment
18 Variables in units of RMB are converted into real 1990 RMB using the
GDP deflator for mainland China from the United Nations.
19 Cadres hold administrative or managerial positions in state-owned
enterprises, government or the Communist Party.
20 The hourly wage is calculated as the sum of an individual’s average
monthly wage, one-twelfth of the annual bonus, and earnings from labor
provided to a collective, all divided by average hours worked per month.
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group and approximately 0 for both control groups. The average levels of private wage employment, self-employment,
and capital assets are lowest in the treatment group, and the
state control group is more similar to the treatment group than
the private control group.21
The treatment group has more education than the other
groups. Individuals in the treatment group have an average of 10.3 years of education, which is 2.1 to 3.0 years
more than the average in the control groups. This difference
raises two potential concerns about the identification strategy.
While I can control for differences in observed characteristics such as education, it is possible that my estimates reflect
time-varying returns to education and other observable characteristics. This potential issue is addressed in section VIB.
The second potential concern is that differences in observable characteristics may suggest the presence of differences
in unobservables. The panel structure of the data allows me to
remove the effects of any unobservable factors that are time
invariant through the inclusion of individual fixed effects.
The data indicate that observable characteristics and individual fixed effects explain approximately 80% of the variation
in prereform housing subsidies among state employees (see
table A1). Furthermore, I will show that the empirical results
do not support this explanation.
V.

Main Results

A. Impact on Entrepreneurship

The regressions with binary outcomes in this analysis are
estimated with a logistic regression. Because the mean rate
of self-employment is low, the logistic model will perform
better than a linear probability model. The theoretical model
suggests that the proper estimating equation includes individual fixed effects to control for the unobserved time-invariant
characteristics, θi , ζi , ψi , and μi , that affect decisions regarding housing and employment. The baseline panel differencesin-differences estimator is implemented as a logistic regression of the form22
Pr(yit = 1) = g(α1 State_Resident89i ∗ Postt + α2 Postt
+ α4 xit + γi + it ),
(8)
where yijt is a dummy variable for self-employment for individual i in year t, State_Resident89i identifies the treatment
group, Postt is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the three
periods following the reform, and γi are individual fixed
effects. The vector of covariates, xit , is a quadratic in age. The
coefficient, α1 , is the estimated effect of the housing program.
The fixed-effects logit has the disadvantage of not yielding
21 Capital is the self-reported amount of productive assets that the
household owns.
22 For the fixed-effects estimator, the logit model is generally preferred
over the probit model because the fixed-effects probit is computationally
more difficult to implement and its estimates are inconsistent for a small
number of time periods (Wooldridge, 2002a).

Table 2.—Impact of the Reform on Self-Employment

State_Resident89 × Post
Post
Age
Age2
Observations

Control = State
Workers
(1)

Control = Private
Workers
(2)

1.907
[0.743]∗
0.042
[0.599]
0.290
[0.134]∗
−0.002
[0.001]
421

2.103
[0.702]∗∗
0.253
[0.296]
0.194
[0.110]∗
−0.002
[0.001]
970

Significant at the ∗∗∗ 1% level, ∗∗ 5% level, ∗ 10% level. Robust standard errors clustered by household in
brackets. Additional controls are individual fixed effects.

estimates of average partial effects without strong assumptions regarding the distribution of γi (Wooldridge, 2002a).
For the fixed-effects logit models, I report the results in coefficients, or log odds ratios, which are interpreted as the log of
the relative odds of the outcome occurring for a group relative to another.23 Again, α1 is the coefficient representing the
program effect. Throughout the paper, the standard errors are
adjusted to allow clustering at the household level.
In table 2, the estimates suggest that the reform significantly increased the log odds of self-employment by 1.9 to
2.1 times for the treatment group relative to the state control
group and the private control group, respectively. While the
treatment group differs from the control groups along some
characteristics, the two control groups also differ substantially from each other along those characteristics. Thus, the
similarity in the coefficient estimates for the treatment group
relative to the two control groups provides some reassurance
that the controls and the fixed effects are removing the impact
of any differences across groups.24
Identification of a panel differences-in-differences estimator requires a parallel-trends assumption, which assumes the
gap in the outcome between the treatment and the control
group would remain the same in the absence of the reform.
In order to examine this assumption, I allow the effects of the
program to vary over time by estimating the following more
flexible fixed-effects logit regression:


Pr(yijt = 1) = g α0 +
βt · State_Resident89i
t≥1991



+ α2 xijt + τt + γi + ijt .

(9)

Relative to the baseline model of equation (8), the flexible
specifications allow us to examine differences in trends in
23 The sample sizes of the fixed-effects logit results reflect the fact that
identification of the coefficients of a fixed-effects logit is off of switchers
(individuals whose value of yit changes).
24 Logit coefficients are scaled by the residual variation of the estimated
equation (Amemiya, 1985). Comparison of coefficients across regressions
depends on the assumption that the unobserved variation is the same across
the samples. The results of a test proposed by Allison (1999) fail to reject the
null hypothesis of equal residual variation for the two samples (χ2 = 1.07).
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Table 3.—Flexible Estimates of Program Effect on Self-Employment
Control = State
Workers
(1)
State_Resident89 × 1991
State_Resident89 × 1993
State_Resident89 × 1997
State_Resident89 × 2000
State_Resident89 × 2004
1991
1993
1997
2000
2004
χ2 : 91 + 93 = 97 + 00 + 04
Observations

−0.553
[0.972]
0.892
[1.319]
2.118
[1.376]
1.590
[1.275]
2.620
[1.425]∗
1.139
[0.391]∗∗∗
0.938
[0.550]∗
1.299
[0.776]∗
1.996
[0.863]∗∗
2.309
[1.167]∗∗
6.28∗∗
421

Control = Private
Workers
(2)
−0.565
[0.916]
1.236
[1.234]
2.461
[1.324]∗
2.308
[1.285]∗
2.676
[1.376]∗
1.1728
[0.216]∗∗∗
0.625
[0.272]∗
1.013
[0.383]∗∗∗
1.152
[0.457]∗∗
2.190
[0.552]∗∗
8.35∗∗∗
970

Significant at the ∗∗∗ 1% level, ∗∗ 5% level, ∗ 10% level. Robust standard errors clustered by household
in brackets. Additional controls are a quadratic in age and individual fixed effects. Chi-square test of
equality between the prereform interactions (State_Resident89 × 1991 and State_Resident89 × 1993) and
the postreform interactions (State_Resident89 × 1997, State_Resident89 × 2000, and State_Resident89 ×
2004).

self-employment before and after the housing reform began
in 1994. An estimate of β1991 and β1993 equal to 0 would show
that the gap in the outcome between the treatment and control groups did not vary before the reform. Hence, it would
support the key identification assumption that trends in selfemployment across the different groups would have been
similar in the absence of the reform.
Table 3 presents the results from the flexible equations
given by equation (9). The interaction with 1989 is omitted.25
In table 3, the coefficient estimates of the prereform interactions, State_Resident89×1991 and State_Resident89×1993,
are small in magnitude and statistically equivalent to 0. This
indicates that relative to earlier wave, the prereform trends in
self-employment of individuals in state-owned housing were
not different from the trends for state-employed or privately
employed individuals in private housing. The results support
the identifying assumption that the prereform trends in selfemployment for residents of state housing were similar to
residents in private housing. The magnitude and significance
of the coefficients shift in 1997, the first survey wave following the start of the reform. Thus, individuals who had the
opportunity to buy their residences from the state transitioned
into entrepreneurship beginning in 1997 at a greater rate than
individuals already living in private housing. A chi-square
test reveals that the coefficients on State_Resident89 × 1991
and State_Resident89 × 1993 are significantly different from
25 The specification that omits both the 1989 and 1991 waves produces
similar results with smaller standard errors (not shown). The decrease in
the standard errors is not surprising given the larger size of the comparison
group.
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State_Resident89 × 1997, State_Resident89 × 2000, and
State_Resident89 × 2004 at the 5% level in both specifications. In comparing the interactions among each of the
postreform years (1997, 2000, 2004) and the treatment indicator, the coefficients are not statistically different from each
other. This indicates that the conditional, postreform trends in
self-employment were similar for the treatment and control
groups.
B. Specification Checks

Time-varying returns to characteristics. In this section, I
address the potential concern that the results are being driven
by changes over time in the returns to observable characteristics along which the treatment group is different from the
control groups. For example, the summary statistics demonstrated that the treatment group has higher average levels of
education than the control groups. The results may reflect
other changes, such as increased access to foreign markets
that highly educated entrepreneurs are able to leverage more
easily than individuals with lower levels of education. I deal
with this concern in two ways. First, I include the interaction
between education and Post directly in the regression. Second, I use a propensity score approach (Rosenbaum & Rubin,
1983; Wooldridge, 2002a), which is a more general method
that examines the impact of differences in characteristics in
addition to education.
The first step of the propensity score procedure estimates
the relationship between observable characteristics and the
probability of being in the treatment group across all individuals in the sample. This estimated propensity score is included
in the second-stage regression where it acts as the control
function and contains all the information in the covariates
that is pertinent in the estimation of the treatment effect. In
the regression framework, I include both the interaction of
the propensity score with the Post dummy.26 This removes
any time-varying effect of differences in observable characteristics between the treatment and control groups on the
coefficient on State_Resident89 × Post.
The first-stage estimates of being in the treatment group
are shown in the first column of table A4 in the table appendix reports the self-employment estimates with time-varying
controls for education (columns 3 and 4) and for the propensity to be in the treatment group (columns 1 and 2). In
all cases, the estimates of State_Resident89 × Post remain
quite similar to the coefficient estimates in the baseline
regressions displayed in table 2. The coefficient estimates of
Propensity × Post indicate that individuals who are observably similar to treatment individuals but not directly affected
by the housing sale are not more likely to enter into selfemployment as a result of the reform. In fact, the regression in
column 2 suggests that state-employed individuals with similar characteristics to the treatment group are significantly less
26 This approach has the same effect as interacting all of the observable
characteristics with Post but has the advantage of being more parsimonious.
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Table 4.—Estimates for Self-Employment: Robustness Checks
Observable Differences Across Groups

State_Resident89 × Post
Propensity × Post
Education × Post
Post
Observations

Control = State
(1)

Private
(2)

1.84
[0.71]∗∗∗
0.51
[1.76]

2.51
[0.74]∗∗∗
−2.43
[1.37]∗

−0.10
[0.89]
421

1.01
[0.53]∗
963

State
(3)
1.77
[0.74]∗
0.11
[0.09]
−0.71
[0.84]
421

Attrition
Private
(4)

State
(5)

Private
(6)

1.99
[0.72]∗∗∗

1.50
[0.60]∗∗

1.85
[0.54]∗∗∗

0.10
[0.07]
−0.45
[0.51]
963

−0.48
[0.47]
435

−1.16
[0.32]∗∗
972

Serial Correlation
State
(7)
1.80
[0.98]∗

0.09
[0.68]
144

Private
(8)
2.06
[0.67]∗∗∗

−0.15
[0.68]
232

Significant at the ∗∗∗ 1% level, ∗∗ 5% level, ∗ 10% level. Robust standard errors clustered by household in brackets. Propensity is the estimated propensity score of being in the treatment group. Additional controls are
a quadratic in age and individual fixed effects.

likely to be entrepreneurs. Overall, the impact of the reform
on entrepreneurship remains robust to addressing changes
in the returns to education and other observable differences
between the treatment and the comparison groups.
Sorting into the treatment and control groups is not random, and a potential alternative explanation for the results is
that a change in the returns to the time-invariant, unobservable characteristics occurred at the same time as the housing
reform. For example, an increase in corruption during the
period of the housing reform might increase the returns to
state connections for an entrepreneur, and state connections
are higher among the treatment group. However, the coefficient estimates of the treatment effect are similar relative to
the two control groups. For a change in the returns to timeinvariant unobservables to be driving the estimates, a specific
relationship in the unobservable characteristics among the
treatment and control groups must hold. It would require
that the average levels of the unobservable characteristics
that influence the decision to enter into self-employment are
similar between the two control groups but different from
the treatment group. This seems unlikely because the stateemployed control group and the privately employed control
group are significantly different from each other along several
characteristics, such as education and household cadres.
Sample attrition. Selective attrition is an unavoidable
and difficult concern with analyses that rely on panel data.
While attrition in my sample of analysis is low in the first two
waves following the launch of the longitudinal survey in 1989
(averaging less than 5% each year), it increases substantially
in the last three waves of the survey. Approximately 14%
of the sample attrites between 1993 and 1997. Furthermore,
the rates of attrition differ across the treatment and control
groups, with the treatment group being more likely to leave
in each wave following the reform. In the 1997 round, 18% of
individuals in state-owned housing in 1993 had attrited compared with 7% of individuals privately employed in 1993 and
16% of state employees without state housing in the previous
sample period. This is not surprising because the theoretical
framework predicts an increase in mobility for the treated relative to the untreated group following the reform. However,

sample attrition can bias the estimates of the impact of the
housing reform on entrepreneurship.
I address the potential bias from sample attrition by using
the inverse probability weighting (IPW) method. The key
assumption underlying this method is that attrition is based
on observable characteristics.27 The IPW method places more
weight on individuals who are likely to attrite in order to create a sample that better reflects the original full sample. The
procedure involves two steps. First, for every wave following
1989, I estimate the probability that each individual remains
in the sample conditional on his or her presence in the previous samples. In other words, for each wave following the first,
I estimate a logit regression where the dependent variable is
whether the individual remained in the survey. The estimates
are shown in table A5 in the Table Appendix. However, the
predicted conditional probabilities are not representative of
the original sample population. Wooldridge (2002b) shows
that the inverse of the joint probability can be used as weights
in the second step of the estimation with the joint probability
calculated directly from the conditional probabilities.
Columns 5 and 6 of table 4 display the results using inverse
probability weighting to correct for sample attrition. Comparing these results to the ones shown in table 2, the attritioncorrected estimates of State_Resident89 × Post imply a
similar, though slightly smaller, effect of the housing reform
on self-employment. These results depend on the assumption
that conditional on the variables in the attrition equation, attrition is ignorable with respect to self-employment. While the
evidence suggests that selection based on observables does
not drive the results, the issue of sample attrition based on
unobservables is an unsolvable problem for the identification
strategy. Heckman’s two-step estimator provides a method
for handling attrition based on unobservables, but the procedure relies on finding an exclusion restriction in the selection
equation. Unfortunately, the data set does not provide a variable that would plausibly predict attrition but not job mobility
and other labor market choices in this context.

27 This assumption is often called “ignorability of selection.” See
Wooldridge (2002a) or Wooldridge (2002b) for more details on inverse
probability weighting.
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In the absence of an empirical method for addressing attrition based on unobservables, I suggest another approach to
thinking about this problem. Preference for risk is a likely
candidate for an unobservable trait that affects both moving
out of the survey area and entry into entrepreneurship. If individuals with greater preferences for risk are more likely to
become entrepreneurs and more likely to move far enough
to leave the sample area, then the bias stemming from attrition based on risk preferences will be downward. Attrition
based on risk preferences is likely to have a similar impact
as attrition based on observables in working against finding
a significant effect of the reform on entrepreneurship.
Serial correlation. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan
(2004) find that differences-in-differences estimates that use
several years of data may lead to substantial underestimates
of the standard errors if serial correlation in the outcomes is
not addressed. Following their approach, I collapse the six
waves of data into two periods, prereform and postreform.
The results for self-employment are shown in the last two
columns of table 4.28 The coefficient estimates are similar in
magnitude and significance to the corresponding estimates in
the baselines regressions.
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Figure 4.—Rates of Unemployment

The mid-1990s was a time of continued economic growth,
and the Chinese government introduced numerous policies
to reform the socialist system. In this section, I consider
alternative explanations for the rise in entrepreneurship. For
another explanation to be plausible, it would not only have to
occur at the same time as the housing reform, but its impact
would have to affect state employees residing in public housing and private employees in a similar manner. Any reforms
that affected all state employees or did not affect private
employees would not explain the significant, positive effect
on entrepreneurship that I find for the treatment group relative
to the two control groups.
Privatization of state assets occurred as state-owned enterprises were converted into private companies. The firm-level
reforms in the state sector resulted in numerous layoffs as
newly privatized companies shed excess labor to achieve
profitability. It is plausible that substantial layoffs would
increase the rate of self-employment if some individuals preferred self-employment over unemployment. However, the
layoffs that resulted from the reform of state-owned enterprises can explain the increase in self-employment only if
state employees in the treatment group were more likely
to lose their jobs than state employees in the control group
and the break occurred around the same time as the housing
reform. Unfortunately, the data in the CHNS are not ideal for
considering this issue because the survey does not ask explicitly about recent lay-offs. The most related information in the

CHNS is unemployment status. Figure 4 shows the unemployment rates of individuals in the CHNS by treatment and
control groups from 1991 to 2004.29 Tn general, the rates of
unemployment among the different groups moved together
in a pattern that demonstrated increased unemployment from
1991 to 2004. A spike in the rate of change in unemployment
for the treatment group relative to the control groups occurred
between 1997 and 2000, but this was not the same time as
the break in home ownership.
Given the limitations in the CHNS data, I also examine whether aggregate trends in layoffs in the state sector
indicated that a break occurred between 1993 and 1997.
Aggregate data on layoffs (xiagang) in state-owned enterprises indicate that the peak in layoffs occurred 1997, 1998,
and 1999 (see table 1 in Giles, Park, & Zhang, 2005). The
share of workers laid off in state-owned enterprises ranged
from 5.7% to 7.2% between 1997 and 1999. In 1995, the corresponding figure was 3.2%. Overall, unemployment data in
the CHNS and the aggregate data both indicate that the bulk
of layoffs in the state sector did not occur around the same
time as the housing reform. However, the potential concern
remains that anticipation of the coming layoffs in the state
sector may have interacted with the effects of the housing
reform to produce larger transitions into entrepreneurship
than we would have seen in the absence of firm-level reforms
and layoffs.
Other reforms were occurring in the state sector as the
central government moved away from a socialist economic
system that combined low wages with the provision of inkind benefits such as housing, health care, and child care.
The value of health care and child care is quite small in
comparison to housing costs, so even if the state monetized
or removed health and child care benefits precisely around
the time of the housing reform, it is likely that the effect of
the housing program would dwarf other changes in benefits. Figure 5 displays the trends in health insurance coverage

28 The majority of the remaining results of the paper are robust to this
correction for the issue of serial correlation. The exception is that the results
of table 7 are no longer significant at the 10% level.

29 The CHNS did not ask about unemployment in the 1989 wave of the
survey or about worker layoffs in any waves.
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Figure 5.—Health Insurance Coverage

Table 5.—Estimates of Private Employment and Employment Status
Private Wage Employment Work Status = Employed
(1)
State_ResideWork89
2.042
× Post
[0.419]∗∗∗
Post
−1.462
[1.038]
State_ResideWork89
× Post × Log(
h)
State_ResideSpouse89
× Post
State_ResideSpouse89
× Post × Log(
h)
χ2 test
α1 + α3
α4 + α5
Observations
912

for the treatment and the control groups across time.30 The
trends indicate that individuals in the treatment group were
more likely to have some type of health insurance coverage
than either of the control groups. The numbers of individuals
with health insurance declined substantially over the early
1990s, but this reduction occurred more gradually than the
housing reform. Not only does the timing of the decline precede the housing reform, but the trends are also moving in
parallel for the three groups. This suggests that changes in
health insurance provision in the state sector cannot explain
the positive effect of the housing reform on entrepreneurship.
For the most part, the economic reforms pursued by the
Communist government were embodied by Deng Xiaoping’s
phrase, “mozhe shitou guo he” (“crossing the river by feeling for stones”). The statement underscores the government’s
emphasis on a gradual reform process. The trends for unemployment and health insurance show gradual changes over
time that were fairly similar for the treatment group and
control groups.
VI.

Impact of Bundling Housing and Employment

Section V provided evidence that transitions into selfemployment among state housing residents increased relative
to other groups as a result of the property reform. This section
tests the predictions of the model associated with the hypothesis that the increase can be explained by the unbundling of
housing from state employment.
A. Mobility

As the theoretical model suggests, we can determine
whether the unbundling of housing from employment decisions contributed to the increase in entrepreneurship by
testing whether the reform resulted in an increase in general
mobility out of the state sector. In other words, the hypothesis on unbundling housing provision from employment
30 I

have dropped the data for health insurance in 1989 because the survey
question in 1989 was different from the subsequent years.

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.322
[1.039]
−1.588
[1.002]

−1.837
[0.789]∗∗
0.567
[1.282]

−2.995
[2.480]
0.652
[1.360]
−0.344
[0.305]
0.637
[1.138]
0.339
[0.592]

−0.118
[0.683]
0.592
[0.249]∗∗

895

803

5.02∗
1.50
762

Coefficients shown. Significant at the ∗∗∗ 1% level, ∗∗ 5% level, and ∗ 10% level. Robust standard errors
clustered by household in brackets. Log(
h) is the logarithm of the average amount of rent subsidy received
in the periods prior to the reform. Regressions also include a quadratic in age and individual fixed effects. In
columns 1 and 2, the sample includes individuals who were state employed prior to the reform. In columns
3 and 4, the sample includes individuals who were state employed prior to the reform and spouses of state
employees living in state-owned housing prior to the reform.

can explain an increase in movement from state-owned
enterprises toward private wage jobs, but the credit constraints story cannot. Thus, I estimate the following equation,
Pr(yit = 1) = g(α1 State_ResideWork89i × Postt
+ α2 Postt + α3 xit + γi + it ),

(10)

with the dependent variable as an indicator that takes a value
of 1 if the individual is employed in a private wage job and
0 otherwise. The sample includes only individuals who were
in state employment in 1989 (or the next prereform wave
with data available). The previous analyses of the impact
of the reform on self-employment have defined treatment
at the couple level; thus, an individual residing in stateowned housing who was not employed in the state sector
but married to a state employee has been categorized in the
treatment group (State_Resident89 = 1). In this regression
focusing on individual labor mobility, the treatment variable,
State_ResideWork89, equals 1 if the individual was working for the state and residing in state-owned housing in 1989
(or the next prereform wave in which data is available). The
results are presented in column 1 of table 5. The log odds
of switching out of the state sector was 2.04 times higher
for the residents of state housing than for the state-employed
comparison group, and this is significant at the 1% level.
The model predicted that individuals with more generous
rent subsidies before the reform should also have higher average abilities as entrepreneurs (θi ) and private wage employees
(ζi ). I estimate
Pr(yit = 1) = g(α1 State_ResideWork89i × Postt
+ α2 Postt + α3 State_ResideWork89i
× Postt × 
hi + α4 xit + γi + it )
(11)
where 
hi is measured as the logarithm of the average amount
of rent subsidy that an individual received in three periods
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before the reform. More specifically, the rent subsidy is calculated as the difference between self-reported market value
and the rent paid for a state-provided housing unit. A positive estimate of α3 provides additional evidence that the
reform increased job mobility among state sector workers.
The estimates in columns 2 indicate that a doubling of the
average prereform rent subsidy corresponded with a 0.59
times increase in the log odds of leaving the state sector for
private employment.
For an additional test of the hypothesis of the mobility
effects of unbundling housing from employment, I exploit
the fact that the effects of unbundling housing from employment must work at the individual level while loosening credit
constraints can affect other household members who are not
working for the state sector. I separate out individuals living
in state-owned housing before the reform and not employed
in the state sector from those individuals who are residing in
a state-owned housing unit and state employed. This separation provides an additional test for whether the impact of the
reform on labor mobility can be attributed to the unbundling
of housing from state employment.
More specifically, I estimate the following fixed-effects
logit equation,
Pr(yit = 1) = g(α1 State_ResideWork89i × Postt
+ α2 Postt + α3 State_ResideSpouse89i
× Postt + α4 xit + γi + it ),
(12)
where State_ResideSpouse89 is an indicator that takes a
value of 1 for residents of public housing who are not state
employed; these individuals are the spouses of workers who
received housing allocations from their employers and are
excluded from State_ResideWork89. In this regression, the
dependent variable is an indicator that takes a value of 1
if the individual is working.31 Because the CHNS does not
ask individuals directly if they changed firms, I use employment status to capture the job mobility of individuals who
were residing in state-owned housing but not employed in
the state sector.32 A negative estimate of the coefficient on
State_ResideWork89 × Post supports the hypothesis that the
prereform system of employer-provided housing reduced
job mobility. These individuals should be more likely to
exit the labor force if they no longer rely on their jobs
for housing. Furthermore, the mobility of spouses of individuals who received housing from their state employers
should not be affected by the reform so coefficient estimates on State_ResideSpouse89 × Post equal to 0 would
provide further support for the validity of the bundling
hypothesis. The results in column 3 of table 5 show that
the coefficient on State_ResideWork89 × Post is negative
and significant at the 5% level and that the coefficient on
31 The

mean of the dependent variable in the sample is 87%.
would not make sense to estimate equation (12) with the dependent variable as private wage employment because individuals for whom
State_ResideSpouse89 = 1 are by definition not employed in the state
sector.
32 It
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State_ResideSpouse89 × Post is small in magnitude and not
significantly different from 0.
I also examine the impact of heterogeneity in prereform
rent subsidies on employment status for state employees and
non-state-employed spouses. I estimate
Pr(yit = 1) = g(α1 State_ResideWork89i × Postt
+ α2 Postt + α3 State_ResideWork89i
× Postt × 
hi + α4 State_ResideSpouse89i
× Postt + α5 State_ResideSpouse89i
× Postt ∗ 
hi + α6 xit + γi + it ).

(13)

A negative estimate of α3 and a 0 estimate of α5 provide
additional evidence that the reform increased labor mobility among state sector workers who had received subsidized
housing benefits. Again, the results support the model’s
hypothesis on the impact of the housing reform on patterns of
labor mobility. Column 4 displays a negative estimate of α3 ,
as predicted, but it is not significant at the 10% level. While
the estimate of α5 is not statistically different from 0, it is
fairly large in magnitude. A chi square test demonstrates that
α1 and α3 are jointly significantly at the 10% level, while α4
and α5 are not jointly different from 0 at the 10% level.
The results presented in table 5 provide strong support for
the idea that the unbundling of housing from state employment led to substantial increases in labor mobility. Individuals
in state-owned housing are more likely to transition into private wage employment and out of the labor force following
the reform than state-employed individuals who were not
living in state-owned housing. Furthermore, the likelihood
increases with the prereform size of the rent subsidy, which is
consistent with the model’s prediction that individuals with
higher levels of rent subsidy also have higher unobserved
ability outside the state sector. Finally, the results that separate residents of state-owned housing who are working in the
state sector from those who are not state employed provide
additional evidence that the housing reform enabled work
transitions that reduced labor misallocation.
B. Wage Growth

Patterns in wage growth for individuals who change sectors
provide a second test of the relevance of unbundling housing
from state employment in explaining the effect of the housing
reform on entrepreneurship. The model implies that the wage
growth for individuals who leave the state sector should be
higher before the reform than after the reform because individuals switching before 1994 needed to be compensated for
the loss of housing benefits. This suggests examining the
following first-difference equation over a selected sample of
individuals who leave the state sector for a private job:
p

s
wit − wi,t−1
= β0 + β1 (State_ResideWork89i × Postt )
+ β4 (xit − xi,t−1 ) + τt + υit ,
(14)
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p

where wit is the monthly real earnings of the individual who
s
is no longer in the state sector in period t, and wi,t−1
is the
monthly real wage in the state sector in period t − 1.33 The
treatment variable, State_ResideWork89, equals 1 if the individual was working for the state and living in state-owned
housing in 1989. The comparison group comprises individuals who were working in the state sector but not living in
state-owned housing in 1989. The specification also includes
year dummies, denoted by τt , rather than just a postreform
indicator. This flexible specification for time captures differences in the intervals between surveys, which vary from two
to four years. If bundling reduced mobility before the reform
and was eliminated or reduced by the reform, then we would
expect β1 < 0. I also examine heterogeneity in the impact of
the reform by the prereform levels of housing subsidy with
the following regression:
p

s
wit − wi,t−1
= β0 + β1 (State_ResideWork89i × Postt )
h)
+ β2 (State_ResideWork89i × Post × 

+ β4 (xit − xi,t−1 ) + τt + υit .

(15)

A negative coefficient on β2 suggests that heterogeneity in the
provision of housing corresponded with the wage increases
required for individuals to leave the state sector and supports
the idea that state employer provided housing reduced labor
mobility.
p
s
I estimate equation (15) with wit , wi,t−1
, and 
h in levels. While the distributions of wages and rent subsidy
appear to be suited for such a specification where both
are measured in logs, the estimate of the triple interaction,
State_ResideWork89 × Post × 
h, requires a strong assumption on the relationship between the dependent variable and

h. In this case, it is difficult to believe that a doubling of 
h at
10 RMB per month has the same percentage effect on wages
as a doubling of 
h at 100 RMB per month. In the levels specification, we would expect that an increase in 
h corresponds to
the same amount of wage gain for an individual leaving the
state sector. In other words, the model predicts a coefficient
on State_ResideWork89 × Post × 
h of −1.
I also control for the differential trends in the returns
of characteristics of individuals in the treatment group
(State_ResideWork89 = 1) and state employees not living
in public housing in 1989. Following section VIB, I estimate
the propensity to be in public housing in 1989 with a sample of state-employed individuals. The results of this step
are shown in column 2 of table A4. I include the propensity
score and its interactions with Post and Post × 
h to control
for differences in observable characteristics between those in
public housing and those in private housing.
Columns 1 and 2 table 6 of imply that public housing residents leaving the state sector needed 15% higher wages to
compensate them for the loss of housing subsidies before
the reform than after the reform. In the CHNS, the reported
33 Fourteen extreme outliers of changes in wages of more than 400 RMB
per hour are excluded.

Table 6.—First-Difference Estimates of Wage Growth of
Former State Employees
Logarithm Specification

State_ResideWork89
× Post
Propensity
× Post
State_ResideWork89
× Post × 
h
Propensity
× Post × 
h
Observations
Adjusted R3

(1)

(2)

−0.153
[0.051]∗∗∗

−0.145
[0.054]∗∗∗
0.086
[0.172]

244
0.15

226
0.17

Level Specification
(3)

(4)

−18.851 −46.549
[29.386] [27.337]∗
32.266
[76.879]
−0.201
−0.323
[0.273]
[0.721]
0.597
[1.433]
256
238
0.10
0.11

Significant at the ∗∗∗ 1% level, ∗∗ 5% level, and ∗ 10% level. Robust standard errors clustered by household
in brackets. Propensity is the estimated propensity score of being in the treatment group. 
h is the average
amount of rent subsidy received in the periods prior to the reform. Regressions also control for a firstdifference quadratic in age, a constant term, and year dummies. The sample includes heads and spouses
who left the state sector.

value of the rental subsidy was approximately 23% of an
individual’s total wages in the prereform period, so the coefficient estimates correspond fairly well with the idea that the
value of housing benefits that state workers received influenced their job tenure decisions. In the level specification
in column 4, an individual needed a wage gain of 47 RMB
more prior to the reform than after, and this is not statistically different from the average monthly value of the rental
subsidy (67 RMB). Furthermore, in the specifications that
include State_ResideWork89 × Post × 
h in columns 3 and 4,
the coefficient estimates on the triple interaction are negative,
but they are not statistically different from 0 at the 10% level.
In column 4, the point estimate of the triple interaction is not
statistically different from the predicted value of −1.
The empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that the
system of housing provision by state work units reduced
mobility before the reform and that the housing reform
removed this barrier to mobility. Both tests give consistent
support for the argument that the reduction in housing benefits associated with state jobs can explain at least part of the
increase in self-employment following housing reform.
VII.

Testing Credit Constraints

A. Appreciation in Housing Prices

The model suggested that a positive relationship between
capital investment or entry into entrepreneurship and postreform gains in housing wealth would provide evidence that
individuals were accessing the value associated with their
state-owned housing to alleviate credit constraints. I use heterogeneity in housing price appreciation across provinces and
time to test for credit constraints.34 The data set on housing
prices is discussed in appendix C. Changes in housing prices
34 Hurst and Lusardi (2004) used fluctuations in housing equity as exogenous changes in wealth to analyze the impact of credit constraints on
entrepreneurship. They found that wealth had no effect on the probability of
entrepreneurship in the United States. In contrast, using a finer geographic
unit of analysis, Fairlie and Krashinsky (2006) did find that appreciation in
housing prices predicted entrepreneurship in the United States.
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Table 7.—Impact of Housing Price Appreciation on Self-Employment and Capital

State_Resident89 × Post × Δq
State_Resident89 × Post
Post × Δq
Post
Observations

FE Logit

FE Logit

Fixed Effects

Self-Employment

Positive Capital

Log(Capital)

Control = State
(1)

Private
(2)

State
(3)

Private
(4)

State
(5)

Private
(6)

4.103
[0.960]∗∗∗
1.432
[0.704]∗∗
−0.856
[1.423]
−0.806
[0.957]
368

1.981
[0.964]∗∗
2.039
[0.492]∗∗∗
1.024
[0.806]
−1.281
[0.863]
854

6.837
[2.515]∗∗∗
1.389
[0.229]∗∗∗
−1.624
[2.126]
−2.192
[0.262]∗∗∗
870

6.859
[0.696]∗∗∗
0.826
[0.451]∗
−1.485
[1.437]
−1.507
[0.267]∗∗∗
1,180

7.508
[3.161]∗∗
1.833
[0.663]∗∗
−1.828
[2.423]
−2.028
[0.128]∗∗∗
911

7.522
[0.948]∗∗∗
1.863
[0.960]∗
−1.572
[1.954]
−1.920
[0.498]∗∗∗
1,286

Significant at the ∗∗∗ 1% level, ∗∗ 5% level, ∗ 10% level. Standard errors clustered by province in brackets. The self-employment regressions are at the individual level, and the capital regressions at the household level.
Δq refers to province-level changes in housing prices. Additional controls are a quadratic in age and fixed effects. The capital regressions also include a constant term.

after the reform determine the housing wealth realized by the
new home owners.
I estimate the following equation:
yijt = g(α1 State_Resident89i × Postt
+ α2 State_Resident89i × Postt × Δqjt + α3 Postt
× Δqjt + α4 Postt + α5 xijt + γi + ijt ),
(16)
where Δqjt represents changes in housing prices in province
j and time t.35 The estimate of α2 is identified by differences in housing price appreciation across provinces and
across time. Because the alleviation of credit constraints
can affect other members of a household, the analysis in
this section defines treatment at the couple level. I examine two dependent variables: self-employment and capital.
When yijt is the self-employment status of individual i or
whether individual i owns productive assets, I estimate the
equation with a fixed-effects logit. When yijt is the logarithm
of the amount of productive assets owned by household i,
a fixed-effects linear regression is estimated. The standard
errors are adjusted to allow clustering at the province level.
Positive estimates of α2 support the hypothesis that the reform
increased entrepreneurship by relaxing capital constraints.
Table 7 presents the results of equation (16). Columns 1 and
2 suggest that a 1 standard deviation increase in housing price
appreciation (13%) following the reform increases the relative log odds of the treatment group entering self-employment
by 0.53 and 0.26 times, respectively. The coefficients on the
triple interaction in columns 3 through 6 in table 7 are significant and positive. For existing capital owners, a 1-standard
deviation increase in housing prices corresponds with an
increase in capital for treated households of over 150% above
the increase in capital for similar households living in areas
of stagnant house prices. The fixed-effects logit estimates of
positive capital ownership confirm that the reform had a larger
35 I do not include State_Resident89 × Δq , which would reflect the
i
jt
impact of changes in housing prices for the treatment group before the
reform. First, it is not possible because the data series for qjt begin in
1993. Second, the theoretical model suggests that housing prices should not
affect the treatment group before the reform because by definition, treated
individuals do not own a home before the reform.

effect on capital in areas where house prices experienced
greater growth. The coefficients on State_Resident89×Post×
Δq in columns 3 and 4 indicate that a 1-standard deviation
increase in house prices led to an increase in the relative
log odds of a transition from zero capital to positive capital
ownership by approximately 0.85 times.
The results in this section rely on the strong assumption that changes in housing prices are orthogonal to other
determinants of business investment and entrepreneurship.
Appreciation in housing prices may be correlated with other
changes in conditions across provinces and time, so the
estimate of α2 may reflect changes other than appreciation
in home values. For example, an inflow of workers to an
area due to local labor demand will lead to an increase in
housing prices and affect individuals’ decisions regarding
entrepreneurship in ways other than through the value of their
homes. I attempt to deal with this issue by including changes
in average wages and consumer prices (as well as their interactions with State_Resident89 × Post) to capture changes in
local economic conditions. The additional control variables
do not have a large effect on the estimates of the coefficients
of interest.36
B. Private Property Rights and Access to Capital of
Entrepreneurs

Another test for credit market failures involves an examination of the impact of the housing reform on capital
invested in small business enterprises. In an environment
with credit constraints, we would expect the postreform ability to capitalize on housing to increase asset investment in
household businesses. However, if the unbundling of housing
from state employment increased entry into entrepreneurship,
then the housing reform could increase capital even in the
absence of credit constraints. To isolate the relevance of credit
constraints on entrepreneurship and avoid the confounding
influence of unbundling benefits from employment, I consider a sample limited to households that either operated a
small business or had a self-employed member in 1993. In the
36 Results

availble from the author.
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Table 8.—Impact of Reform on Capital
Full Sample of Households
Control = State
(1)
State_Resident89 × Post
Post
Observations
Adjusted R2

Control = Private
(2)

1.128
[0.133]∗∗∗
−1.217
[0.109]∗∗∗
3,177
0.18

1.512
[0.150]∗∗∗
−1.575
[0.121]∗∗∗
3,539
0.29

1993 Business Households
Control = State
(3)
1.824
[0.583]∗∗∗
−2.021
[0.316]∗∗∗
413
0.23

Control = Private
(4)
1.896
[0.654]∗∗∗
−2.053
[0.278]∗∗∗
854
0.25

Robust standard errors clustered by household in brackets. Significant at the ∗∗∗ 1% level, ∗∗ 5% level, ∗ 10% level. Capital is measured at the household level, and these regressions also include household fixed effects,
a quadratic in the age of the head, and a constant term.

limited sample, a positive effect of the reform on the amount
of capital owned by households provides evidence that the
reform’s alleviation of credit constraints is independent of
unbundling employment and housing.
The results are presented in table 8. Columns 1 and 2 display the estimates for the full sample, and columns 3 and 4
correspond to the limited sample of households involved in
a small business in 1993. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent
variable is the logarithm of the household’s total market value
of the professional and productive equipment that they own
plus 1.37 The coefficient estimates of State_Resident89×Post
for the full sample and the limited sample are all significant
and with somewhat larger estimates for 1993 business households. For the full sample, the coefficients indicate that the
reform increased treated households’ ownership of productive assets by 340% relative to privately employed households
and by around 200% relative to state-employed households
in privately owned housing. The corresponding estimates for
households already engaged in small business activities are
around 500%. They indicate that the increase in capital is
not merely driven by entry into entrepreneurship. The magnitude of the impact of the housing reform on capital is quite
large, but this is not surprising given the low initial levels of
capital investment and the large difference between the market value and the government price charged on the homes.
While there is a positive relative effect of the reform on the
value of capital owned by the treatment group, the coefficient
on Post is negative and significant. This suggests that there
was a trend toward decreasing investment in small businesses
among nontreatment households.
Comparing the impact of the reform on capital for the full
sample and the sample limited yields a lower-bound estimate
of the contribution of the relaxation of credit constraints on
the increase in capital investment by the treatment group. The
total effect of the reform on capital owned by treated households is given by the coefficients on State_Resident89 × Post
in columns 1 and 2 in table 8. The lower-bound contribution
of the relaxation of credit constraints can be measured with
the corresponding coefficients in columns 3 and 4. Households that engaged in a business in 1993 make up about 5%
of treatment households, and their average level of capital
holdings in 1993 is 610 RMB. These numbers, combined
37 Other specifications that demonstrate that the results are not driven by a
mass of zero values in the dependent variable are available from the author.

with the average capital owned by all treatment households
shown in table 1, suggest that at least 65% of the total increase
in capital of the treatment group can be attributed to the relaxation of credit constraints associated with the housing reform.
The evidence suggests that the alleviation of credit constraints
played a larger role in the expansion of investment in business enterprises than the unbundling of housing provision
from state employment.

VIII.

Conclusion

This paper presents new evidence on the economic implications of employer-provided housing in the state sector.
My results suggest that the participation of state employers
in the housing market introduced distortions to individuals’ labor market choices. By deterring job mobility and the
private accumulation of property, the prereform system of
in-kind housing benefits created inefficiencies in the labor
market. The empirical evidence indicates that the sale of
state-owned housing encouraged entrepreneurship among
individuals who received the opportunity to purchase the
homes that they had been renting from their state employers.
This paper provides a framework for understanding the two
mechanisms through which the privatization of state housing
assets can increase entrepreneurship and aggregate productivity. One explanation is that the conversion of state assets to
private property allowed individuals to capitalize on the value
associated with their real estate and hence relieved credit constraints. The other explanation highlights the potential impact
of unbundling housing provision from employment on job
mobility. While it is impossible to use the reform to examine either credit constraints or the bundling of housing and
employment in isolation, the model yielded predictions to
test the relevance of each argument.
The empirical results support the idea that both mechanisms played a role in the positive impact of the reform on
entrepreneurship among the former tenants of state housing. This work provides some evidence that credit markets
failed to provide efficient levels of capital for small businesses
in China, and this affected both entry into entrepreneurship
and the accumulation of productive assets. While individuals
respond to the total compensation package and make optimal
choices, the bundling of housing benefits with employment
in the state sector resulted in matches between workers and
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employers that were not the most productive from the perspective of a social planner. Furthermore, a system that allows
state bureaucrats to allocate housing units among state sector
workers generates the potential for corruption. This work has
policy relevance for other developing countries that continue
to provide subsidized state-owned housing for workers in
civil service and state-owned enterprises. Policymakers have
the opportunity to encourage small businesses by promoting private ownership of assets and increasing small business
lending in the formal sector.
The program represented a large shift in the ideology
of the government regarding private property rights as it
encouraged private ownership of homes. It succeeded in turning China into a country with one of the highest rates of
home ownership in the world. I have argued that this reform
allowed constrained individuals with entrepreneurial ability the opportunity to begin business ventures and increased
labor mobility out of the sizable state sector. However, an
understanding of the returns to privatizing public housing
assets in other countries requires more analysis on the legal
and financial institutions that are necessary for such a housing
program to have an effect.
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APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B
Impact of the Reform on Home Ownership
Figure 1 demonstrates that the trends in home ownership were fairly
parallel for the two groups before and after the state sale of housing.39
Table A2 in the Table Appendix displays coefficients of fixed-effects logit
estimates of equation (8), where the dependent variable is home ownership.
The housing program increased the log odds of home ownership for the
treatment group relative to the control groups by approximately five to seven
times. Overall, the results in Table A2 confirm that the housing program
was successful in increasing the home ownership rate among public housing
tenants.

Evidence on Rent Subsidy and Wage Compensation
The relationship between employer-provided housing and job mobility
implied by the model depends on the system of housing allocation to state
employees in China. The key assumption is that wages in the state sector are not fully adjusted based on the amount of rental subsidy that an
individual receives. Wages in the state sector in China are set according to
official tables that depend on observable characteristics such as occupation
and tenure. Thus, if two individuals with identical characteristics work in
the same position at a state-owned enterprise, their wages will be equal
regardless of differences in the value of their housing allocations. In this
appendix, I present empirical evidence to support the assumption that the
wages of state employees with similar characteristics are not adjusted to offset differences in their housing benefits. First, I examine whether the wages
of state employees with public housing are significantly lower than similar
state sector workers living in private housing. Second, I analyze whether
the amount of rental subsidy is negatively correlated with the wages of state
employees conditional on observable characteristics.
The results of the first test are displayed in columns 1 and 2 of table A1 in
the Table Appendix. The dependent variable is the logarithm of an individual’s wage. The sample is limited to state employees in the prereform waves.
The inclusion of one-digit occupation fixed effects in column 2 absorbs any
effects from differences in occupations of treatment individuals and nontreated state employees. The coefficient estimates of State_ResideWork89
are similar for both specifications, and neither is significantly different from
0. Conditional on observable characteristics such as age and education, the
average wages of employees in state-owned enterprises are the same regardless of whether they receive a subsidized housing allocation. Furthermore,
the point estimates are quite small. The average prereform rent subsidy
was worth 23% of the wages of a state employee, and wage differences of
1.5% and 1.6% implied by columns 1 and 2, respectively, are considerably
smaller than the average value of the rental subsidies. I also include the
number of household members who are cadres to capture connections in
the state sector. The estimates indicate that state connections do not influence wages, and this supports the assumption of the model that μi is not
perfectly correlated with ψi .
The second test uses the actual amount of rent subsidy rather than just a
binary division between whether a person lives in a state-subsidized home.
In the estimates in columns 3 and 4 in table A1, the dependent variable
is the logarithm of the rent subsidy received in each year plus 1 and the
sample is limited to prereform years. In column 3, the positive and significant impact of cadres in the household on the prereform amount of rent
subsidy confirms that unobserved connections, μi , determine a significant
portion of the variation in 
hi . While the lack of significance of the coefficient on Household Cadre in the estimation with household fixed effects
provides some support for the theoretical assumption that people’s unobserved connections in the state sector are time invariant, the standard errors
are too large to be conclusive. The coefficients on Monthly Wage, which is
measured as the logarithm of a household’s real monthly wages, are economically small and statistically equivalent to 0.38 The point estimate with
household fixed effects indicates that a doubling of wages corresponds to a
decrease in rent subsidies of 4.2%. Overall, the results reinforce the findings
of the first test. The correlation between wages and housing benefits is not
statistically different from 0, and the magnitude of the relationship is too
small to support the idea that wages are adjusted to offset differences in the
value of the state housing allocation.

38 Measuring the wages and rent subsidies in levels, which relaxes of the
assumptions associated with a log-log regression, produces similar results.

APPENDIX C
Supplementary Data Sources
Data on housing prices that begin as early as the mid-1990s are not common. To my knowledge, the only aggregate series that extends as far back as
1993 are provincial statistics on the value and the floor space of residential
homes sold in the China Statistical Yearbooks, published by the National
Bureau of Statistics. Because my focus is on urban areas, I use the price
series covering cities, towns, and industrial and mining areas rather than
entire provinces. The average price per square meter of residential space is
constructed as the total value divided by the floor space sold from 1993 to
2000.40 Other province-level data used as controls, such as average wages
and the urban consumer price index, are also from the China Statistical
Yearbooks. The average province-level wages and housing prices are converted into real 1990 RMB using the GDP deflator for mainland China from
the United Nations. The appreciation in the price of residential housing is
constructed as the percentage change in the real average price per square
meter since the last survey.

TABLE APPENDIX

Table A1.—Wages and Housing Benefits of State Employees in
Prereform Years (1989–1993)
Logarithm of Wages

State_ResideWork89

OLS
(1)

OLS
(2)

−0.015
[0.042]

−0.016
[0.041]

Monthly wage
Household cadre
Occupation FE
Observations
Adjusted R2

0.024
[0.018]
No
2,805
0.14

0.007
[0.019]
Yes
2,722
0.14

Logarithm of Rent Subsidy
OLS
(3)

0.077
[0.081]
0.152
[0.090]∗
No
1,456
0.28

FE
(4)

−0.042
[0.064]
0.068
[0.083]
No
1,456
0.80

Significant at the ∗∗∗ 1% level, ∗∗ 5% level, ∗ 10% level. Robust standard errors clustered by household in
brackets. The log wage regressions in columns 1 and 2 are at the individual level, and the log rent subsidy
regressions in columns 3 and 4 are at the household level. The regressions also include indicators for year
and province, a quadratic in age, and a constant term. In addition, the OLS regressions in columns 1 and
2 include education and a male indicator, and column 3 includes the education of the head of house.

39 A breakdown by the particular definitions of the treatment group, the
state control group, and the private control group provides similar support
for the parallel trends assumption.
40 Urban housing price data in 2004 are excluded because of clear evidence
of at least one error in the published data in that year. There is a dramatic
drop in the value of residential sales in urban areas for at least one province
(Liaoning) by a factor of 100, but no corresponding drop for the same series
in the flanking years, the area of residential homes sold in urban areas in
2004, province-wide housing prices, or the prices of commercial buildings.
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Table A2.—Impact of the Reform on Home Ownership
Control = State
Workers
(1)
State_Resident89 × Post

Control = Private
Workers
(2)

7.224
[1.323]∗∗∗
−4.213
[1.210]∗∗∗
1,418

Post
Observations

4.814
[0.642]∗∗∗
−1.198
[0.577]∗∗
1,626

Significant at the ∗∗∗ 1% level, ∗∗ 5% level, ∗ 10% level. Robust standard errors clustered by household
in brackets. Additional controls are a quadratic in age and individual fixed effects.

Table A3.—Fixed-Effects Logit Estimates of Residential
Move of Household
Control = State
(1)
State_Resident89 × Post

Control = Private
(2)

1.385
[0.407]∗∗∗
0.018
[0.354]
561

Post
Observations

1.111
[0.329]∗∗∗
0.272
[0.265]
765

Coefficients shown. Significant at the ∗∗∗ 1% level, ∗∗ 5% level, ∗ 10% level. Standard errors clustered
by household in brackets. Regressions also include a quadratic in age of the head of house.

Table A4.—Estimates of the Propensity Score of
State_ResideWork89
Full Sample
(1)
Age
Age2
Years of education
Male
Household cadre
Observations

0.038
[0.057]∗∗∗
−0.001
[0.000]∗∗∗
0.197
[0.019]∗∗∗
−0.356
[0.057]∗∗∗
0.711
[0.204]∗∗∗
1,861

State-Employed Sample
(2)
0.117
[0.086]
−0.000
[0.001]
0.097
[0.023]∗∗∗
−0.791
[0.127]∗∗∗
0.371
[0.2107]∗
1,017

Coefficients of logit estimates shown. Significance at the ∗∗∗ 1% level, ∗∗ 5% level, ∗ 10% level. Robust
standard errors clustered by household in brackets. Additional controls are province indicators and a
constant term.

Table A5.—Logit Estimates of Attrition

State_Resident89
Age
Age2
Education
Male
Log(HH Size)
Married
Observations

Pr(Stay 1991)
(1)

Pr(Stay 1993)
(2)

Pr(Stay 1997)
(3)

Pr(Stay 2000)
(4)

Pr(Stay 2004)
(5)

0.004
[0.015]
−0.002
[0.004]
0.000
[0.000]
−0.002∗
[0.001]
0.004
[0.004]
0.025
[0.017]
0.077
[0.063]
1,861

−0.009
[0.023]
0.006
[0.006]
−0.000
[0.000]
0.001
[0.002]
−0.006
[0.006]
0.069∗∗
[0.031]
0.052
[0.042]
1,475

−0.087∗∗∗
[0.031]
0.025∗∗
[0.010]
−0.000∗∗∗
[0.000]
−0.003
[0.003]
−0.004
[0.010]
0.025
[0.037]
−0.044
[0.038]
1,148

−0.021
[0.029]
−0.034∗
[0.018]
0.000∗
[0.000]
−0.003
[0.003]
0.003
[0.008]
0.050
[0.036]
−0.008
[0.040]
835

0.020
[0.042]
0.003
[0.020]
−0.000
[0.000]
−0.021∗∗∗
[0.005]
0.022∗
[0.013]
0.031
[0.054]
0.064
[0.065]
816

Average marginal effects shown. Robust standard errors clustered by household in brackets. Significant at the ∗∗∗ 1% level, ∗∗ 5% level, ∗ 10% level. Additional controls are province fixed effects.

